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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
appellant Farmers New World Life Insurance Company ("Farmers")
respectfully submits the following brief in reply to the brief of
respondent Bountiful City ("the City").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Farmer disputes the City's characterization of certain facts
of record, as follows:
1.

The City lists the damages alleged by Farmers as loss

of income, diminution of value, costs of repair, and reclamation
of vegetation.
the

(Respondent's brief at 5. )

list, however,

the additional

The City omits from

allegation

that

certain

portions of the mall were rendered uninhabitable by the injuries
to the mall.

(R. 22, 423; Add. 22, 83.)
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS

1.

A qualified-immunity interpretation of § 63-30-3, para.

2, is reasonable and does not render the immunity language of
that paragraph meaningless.

On the other hand, an absolute-

immunity interpretation violates article I, § 24 because it
arbitrarily denies persons injured by flood control construction
the right to sue, while persons injured by other types of water
management construction are allowed the right to sue.
The correct standard of scrutiny to apply in this case is
the standard articulated by this Court in Malan v. Lewis, 693
P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), not the rational basis test.

Like Malan,

this case involves the right to sue under the open courts clause
of the Utah Constitution, article I, § 11, because at common law
cities were liable for negligent construction of long-term flood

control improvements.

Such construction is not a governmental

function nor is it an exercise of police power.
entirely different than emergency flood control.

Thus, it is
Since the

objective of § 63-30-3, para. 2, is to protect police power flood
control

efforts, granting

immunity

for non-emergency

flood

control construction does not reasonably or substantially further
the statutory objective.
2.

The enactment of § 63-30-10.5, which waives immunity

for takings or damagings, in no way obviates the need for this
Court to overrule Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105
(Utah 1960).

The constitutional waiver of immunity found in

article I, § 22 is independent of and broader than the waiver of
immunity found in § 63-30-10.5
The right to compensation under article I, § 22 extends to
non-intentional damagings.

To the extent that Lund v. Salt Lake

County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921), is to the contrary, it should be
overruled as violating modern case law and the policy underlying
article I, § 22.

The requirement in article I, § 22, that

property must be damaged "for public use" means that the damage
must result from construction of a public improvement, and in no
way requires a retention of the Lund rule.
3.

The determination of when a taking has occurred is

essentially a factual determination.

Farmers has adequately

pleaded a taking under the Fifth Amendment by alleging that the
damage to the mall rendered certain portions uninhabitable.

Such

allegations satisfy the requirements for alleging a taking set
2

forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
4.
contract

Farmers is also entitled to sue based on the implied
created by its easement with the City.

The City

manifested its assent to such a contract by taking delivery of
the instrument creating the easement.
ARGUMENT
Point I:
A,

The Flood Control Amendment to § 63-30-3 Creates Only
Qualified Immunity for Flood Control Construction
The Flood Control Amendment Is Not Rendered "Meaningless" by a Qualified-Immunity Interpretation

The flood-control immunity created in paragraph two of § 6330-3

should

exceptions

be

interpreted

as being

as the governmental-function

paragraph one of § 63-30-3.

subject

to

the

same

immunity defined in

Under such a "qualified-immunity"

interpretation, Farmers is entitled to sue under § 63-30-9, which
waives immunity for injuries caused by a dangerous or defective
condition of a public improvement.

See Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d

1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (§ 63-30-9 applies to damages caused by
construction of a public improvement).

Moreover, Farmers is also

entitled to sue under § 63-30-10, which waives immunity for
injuries caused by negligence of an employee.
The City argues that the phrase "governmental entities . . .
are immune from suit" in paragraph two is meaningless unless it
is interpreted to create absolute, unqualified immunity for all
flood control acts.

A qualified-immunity interpretation does not

render the phrase meaningless, however, because the phrase
3

contains the additional language, not found in paragraph one of §
63-30-3, that
employees

"governmental entities and their officers and

are immune

from suit."

(Emphasis added.)

This

additional language expands the scope of immunity under paragraph
two to include officers and employees of governmental entities,
unlike paragraph one.

Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978)

(immunity under paragraph one does not include employees);
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977) (same).

Therefore,

a qualified-immunity interpretation does not render the phrase
meaningless.
B.

If § 63-30-3 Creates Absolute Liability for NonEmergency Flood Control Construction, Then the Statute
Violates Equal Protection

The City argues that an absolute-immunity interpretation of
§ 63-30-3, para. 2, does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Utah Constitution, article I, § 24, as articulated by this
Court in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
gives three reasons for its argument:

The City

(1) Farmers has no right

to a remedy under the open courts clause, Utah Constitution,
article I, § 11, and therefore the Malan v. Lewis standard does
not

apply

here;

(2) the proper

standard

to apply

is the

traditional rational basis test articulated by federal equal
protection cases; and

(3) when a rational basis standard is

applied, an absolute-immunity interpretation of § 63-30-3, para.
2 does not violate equal protection.
Before addressing these arguments directly, it is important
to restate the Malan standard, in reply to the City's criticism
4

that it is "vaguely defined" by Farmers.

The Malan standard can

be best understood by contrasting it with traditional federal
equal protection analysis.

Under this analysis, a legislative

classification

will

ordinarily

be upheld

if there

is any

conceivable rational basis for the classification, and if there
is

any

conceivable,

classification

rational

and a legitimate

relationship

between

statutory objective.

the
This

analysis, which is often referred to as the "rational basis"
test, affords almost total deference to statutory classifications
unless

they

are

"suspect"

or

affect

fundamental

rights.

Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1989).
In Malan this Court refused to be bound by the traditional
federal equal protection analysis in interpreting Utah's own
"equal protection" clause, article

I, § 24.

The

standard

articulated in Malan does not afford total deference to statutory
classifications,

especially when such classifications diminish a

constitutional (but not necessarily a "fundamental") right, such
as the right to seek a remedy under article I, § 11 of the Utah
Constitution.

Mountain Fuel Supply, Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

752 P.2d 884, 889-90 (Utah 1988); Malan, 693 P.2d at 674 n.17.
In such

instances, the

statutory

classifications

must be

reasonable and must in fact reasonably and substantially further
the legislative purpose of the statute.

Condemarin, 775 P.2d at

355, 373; Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 890; Malan, 693 P.2d
at 670.
the

The determination of reasonableness takes into account

degree

to which

the

statute
5

unreasonably

burdens the

constitutional

right.

See Malan,

Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 354, 373.
requires

a

"real

and

693 P.2d

at

674 n.17;

In short, the Malan standard

thoughtful

examination"

of

the

classification and the relationship between the classification
and the legislative purpose.
1.

Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 356.

Farmers Does Have a Right under the Open Courts Clause,
and Therefore the Malan Standard Applies.

The City does not deny that if Farmers has a right to a
remedy against the City under the open courts clause of the Utah
Constitution, article I, § 11, then the Malan standard applies to
this case.

The City argues, however, that Farmers has no such

right because at common-law Farmers had no right to sue a city
for improper construction of a flood control system.

See Berry

ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)
(article I, § 11 protects common-law causes of action).

This

argument is based on the proposition that at common law cities
were

immune

from

liability

for damages resulting

from the

exercise of a governmental function, and upon the unsupported
assertion that non-emergency flood control construction is the
exercise of a governmental function.

(Respondent's brief at 10-

13. )
Farmers disagrees that the determination of whether it has a
right under article I, § 11, depends solely on Farmers' rights at
common law.

See Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717

P.2d 670, 676 n.3 (Utah 1985) (common law only measures "to an
extent" rights under article I, §11).
common

law

cities were

liable

6

for

Nevertheless, even at
improper

or

negligent

construction of flood control improvements.
Flood Control, § 12(b) (1968).

52A C.J.S. Levees &

For example, in Jordan v. City of

Mt. Pleasant, 15 Utah 449, 49 P. 746 (1897), this Court held the
city of Mount Pleasant liable for damages caused by its negligent
construction of a long-term flood control system.

The Court

reasoned that in constructing such an improvement, the city had
the duty "to use all reasonable means and precautions not to
cause the destruction of or injury to private property."

Id.

See also Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 63, 1 P. 160, 162 (1881)
("a

public work, authorized by law, must be executed in a

reasonably proper and skillful manner").
Although Jordan v. City of Mt. Pleasant, supra, did not
expressly decide whether non-emergency flood control construction
was a governmental function entitling cities to immunity, the
implication of its holding is that such construction is not a
governmental function.
this to be so.

A number of courts have expressly held

Denver v. Talarico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1

(1936); Denver v. Stutzman, 95 Colo. 165, 33 P.2d 1071 (1934);
Boise Development Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032
(1917); Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 55 P. 887 (1899);
Krantz v. City of Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227 (1948);
E. B. Metal & Rubber Industries, Inc. v. Washington County, 102
A.D. 2d 599, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 794 (1984); Ordway v. Caniesteo, 66

7

Hun. 569, 21 N.Y.S. 835 (1893); Barden v. Portage, 79 Wis. 126,
48 N.W. 210 (1891).1
The

foregoing

cases

are consistent with this Court's

definition of "governmental function."

In Thomas v. Clearfield

City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), this Court held the maintenance
of sanitary sewers to not be a governmental function because
sewage disposal was not of such a unique character that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency, or that it was an
activity that "government alone must do."

Id. at 739, quoting

Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981).
The Court pointed to the fact that private individuals may and
often do undertake such activities, and that no statute requires
municipalities to engage in such activities.

Id.

The same rationale applies to non-emergency flood control
construction.

It is not an activity of such a unique character

that it can only be performed by the government, and is not an
activity that government

alone must do.

Certainly private

individuals may and often do undertake the construction of
private flood and water control projects.
1

See, e.g., Burton v.

Similarly, the construction, maintenance, and operation of
sanitary and storm sewers have been held to not be governmental
functions. See Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. Sanitary District, 676
P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) (sanitary sewer); Thomas v. Clearfield City,
642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982) (sanitary sewer); Slemp v. City of North
Miami, 545 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1989) (storm sewer); Elledge v. City
of Pes Moines, 144 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1966) (storm sewer); St.
Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Kaw Valley Tunneling, Inc., 589
S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1979) (storm sewer); Accurate Die Casting Co. v.
City of Cleveland, 442 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio App. 1981) (storm sewer);
City of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1985) (storm
sewer); City of Watauga v. Taylor, 752 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.
1988) (storm sewer).
8

Celentano, 658 P.2d 247 (Ariz. App. 1982).
cities are empowered
drainage

to control watercourses

and construct

and sewage systems, they are not charged with the

responsibility

to protect the public from flooding, as are

counties and the state.
(giving

Furthermore, although

Compare U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10-8-16 & -38

cities power to regulate watercourses and construct

drainage and sewage facilities) with U.C.A., 1953, §§ 17-8-5 &
73-2-22 (giving counties and state power to deal with floods and
construct flood control).
In sum, pursuant to Jordan v. City of Mt. Pleasant, supra,
Farmers had the right at common law to sue the City for negligent
flood

control

construction.

Moreover, non-emergency

flood

control construction is not an activity so essential or uniquely
governmental that it should immunize cities from liability for
failing

to take

proper

precautions

in such

construction.

Accordingly, Farmers has the constitutional right to sue under
article I, § 22, and the Ma Ian standard should apply to this
case.2
The cases cited by the City are not to the contrary.
Wilkinson

v.

State, 42 Utah

483, 134 P.

626

(1913),

is

distinguishable because in that case the defendant was the state
board of land commissioners, which unlike a municipal corporation
2

The City also argues that Farmers has no right under
article I, § 11, and therefore the Malan standard does not apply,
because Farmers has an alternative remedy against the other
defendants in this case. However, whether Farmers can prevail
against any of these defendants, and to what proportion their
comparative negligence may be, is a question of fact that cannot
be decided on summary judgment.

9

is solely a creature of the state and therefore at common law was
presumed to always act in a governmental capacity.

Bingham v.

Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) (explaining
difference, for purposes of tort liability, between municipal
corporations and quasi-municipal corporations).

Furthermore, in

Wilkinson there were no allegations of negligence, without which
there could be no liability.
In McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097
(Utah 1957), also cited by the City, the cityfs non-liability was
based not on sovereign immunity, but rather on the "common enemy"
doctrine, which allows riparian landowners to take whatever
precautions

may be necessary

in response to

extraordinary

flooding to prevent damage, even if lower riparian landowners are
damaged.

McKell expressly declined to address the issue of

sovereign immunity.
2.

305 P.2d at 1100.

The Rational Basis Standard Does Not Apply.

In light of the foregoing section, the rational basis test
simply can not apply to this case.

To do so would violate this

Court's unanimous decision in Malan v. Lewis.

The Utah cases

cited by the City in which a rational basis standard was applied
all pre-date Malan.
The City claims that an "overwhelming majority" of other
courts apply the rational basis standard in sovereign immunity
cases.

The better-reasoned cases, however, hold that where the

state waives, even partially,

its sovereign

immunity, any

classifications made in reference thereto must be reasonable.
10

E.g., Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975).
In such a situation, courts have held various sovereign immunity
statutes unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.

Greyhound

Food Management, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.
Ohio 1986), aff'd 852 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1988); Bernthal v. City
of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985); Jenkins v. State, 85
Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975).
3.

The Flood Control Amendment to § 63-30-3 Fails to Pass
the Malan Standard.

Finally, the City argues that the flood control amendment to
§ 63-30-3 does not deny equal protection under article I, § 24.
The City hypothesizes that a rational distinction exists between
long-term flood control and other municipal improvements on the
ground
control

that cities cannot budget for construction of flood
improvements

improvements.

the

way

they

can

for

other

public

Accordingly, the City argues, the classification

reasonably furthers the statute by protecting monies in the state
disaster relief fund as well as treasuries of municipalities
engaged in flood control measures.
The foregoing analysis is purely a rational basis analysis,
in that it accepts any conceivable rational basis for the
classification.

It fails to conduct a "real and thoughtful

examination" of (a) the reasonableness of the classification and
(b) whether

the

classification

in

fact

reasonably

and

substantially furthers the legislative purpose of the statute.
It also fails to take into account (c) the degree to which the
statute unreasonably burdens constitutional rights.
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(a)

Reasonableness

of

the

Classification.

The

reasonableness of a statutory classification cannot be judged in
isolation, but rather must be judged in the context of the
statutory pattern of which the classification is a part.

Malan

v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984); Jenkins v. State, 85
Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363, 1368 (1975).
Section 63-30-3 is part of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, which is a comprehensive statutory scheme defining the scope
of governmental immunity.

Immunity is retained for injuries

resulting from the exercise of a "governmental function," except
as specifically waived.

One such waiver is found in § 63-30-9,

which waives immunity for "any injury caused from a dangerous or
defective condition of any ... public improvement."

The term

"public improvement" encompasses water management systems such as
dams, reservoirs, canals, and sewer drains.

§ 63-30-9 (dams and

reservoirs); Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1088
(Utah 1975) (canals and sewer drains).

The waiver extends not

only to damages resulting from defective conditions in completed
improvement, but also to damages resulting from the construction
of such improvements.

Parrish v. Layton City Corp., supra;

Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975).
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that if paragraph two
of § 63-30-3 is interpreted as creating absolute immunity for
construction of "flood and storm systems," such an interpretation
results in the unequal treatment of similarly situated persons.
Such an interpretation would deny a person injured by the
12

construction of a flood control system the right to sue, while at
the same time granting this right to a person injured by a water
management system that is not "flood control."
There is no reasonable basis for treating construction of
flood control systems any differently than the construction of
dams,

reservoirs,

management systems.

canals,

sewer

drains, and

other

water

Both types of systems serve essentially the

same purpose of channelling and draining water.

As a practical

matter, the only difference between the two is that the former is
labeled

"flood" control

built with

(rather than water management) or is

flood control

improvement funds.

funds rather than ordinary public

That is not a sufficient basis, however, to

deny one person the right to sue while allowing a similarly
situated person that same right.
The City argues that a rational distinction exists between
the two types of improvement.

Without any support, the City

hypothesizes that cities are unable to include flood control
construction as part of their normal operating budget the way
they can budget other types of construction.
The City's hypothesis, however, lacks any substantial basis.
By statute cities are empowered to construct and regulate water
management systems, including conduits, drains, streams, canals,
ditches, storm sewers, and watercourses.
10-8-13, -15, -16, & -38.

See U.C.A., 1953, §§

Certainly cities can and often do

budget for such construction as part of their normal operating
budget.

Thus, if a city wished to include one of the foregoing
13

systems in its budget as a "flood control" measure, it could do
so.
It is true that, in the instant case, the City paid for the
improvement out of county flood control funds.

That does not

prove that the City could not have budgeted and paid for the
improvement out of its own funds.

Rather, it indicates that the

City preferred not to use its own funds where county funds were
available.

The mere fact that the City desired to conserve its

own funds does not provide, however, a reasonable basis for
denying Farmers the right to sue, in light of the right granted
to similarly situated persons.
A second reason why the classification in this case is
unreasonable is because the flood control amendment attempts to
transform

a non-governmental

function

function merely by defining it as such.

into a governmental
As originally enacted,

the Governmental Immunity Act had twin goals.

One goal was to

reaffirm sovereign immunity for the exercise of "governmental
functions" so that essential, core government activities would
not be threatened by overwhelming losses to the public treasury
caused by huge lawsuits.
P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605
The other goal was to broaden the extent

of government tort liability by impliedly waiving immunity for
all "non-governmental function," so that "more innocent victims
injured by tortious conduct on the part of public entities [would
be allowed] access to the courts for redress."
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Id. at 1237.

In

light

unreasonable

these

twin

goals, it

is

arbitrary

and

for the Legislature to define an activity as a

"governmental
reasonable

of

function" unless

it truly

limitations, the Legislature

immunity for any type of non-governmental

is one.
could

Without

reinstitute

function by simply

passing legislation that arbitrarily labels it as a "governmental
function."

The construction, maintenance and operation of golf

courses, swimming pools, recreational

facilities, and sewers

would all once again be "governmental functions."

This would

destroy the whole scheme behind the Act, as well as undo this
Court's painstaking efforts to define the term

"governmental

function."
For both of the above reasons, the classification created by
§ 63-30-3 is unreasonable.
(b)

Whether the Classification in Fact Reasonably and

Substantially Furthers the Legislative Purpose of the Statute.
In Branam v. Provo School District, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1989),
this Court recently discussed the legislative intent behind the
paragraph two of § 63-30-3.

The Court stated that it was not the

legislature's intent to "immunize any entity entitled to the
label 'governmental' from anything it might do in any capacity
with what could be termed 'flood waters'":
Rather, the legislation was concerned about potential
liability from police power measures taken to protect
public and private property from natural disasters such
as the heavy flooding that occurred in many locations
in Utah in 1983. [117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8, emphasis
added.]
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By using the words "police power" to explain the intent
behind § 63-30-3, para. 2, Branam provides an important insight
into the objective of the statute.

One of the state's essential

police power functions, which is rightly to be protected, is its
power to respond to emergencies.

Such police power functions

include not only responding to flood emergencies, but also to
fires, mob violence, lawlessness, etc.

In order to properly

carry out such activities, the state and its subdivisions need
the freedom to act quickly and decisively, unhampered by the fear
of possible lawsuits, since failure to act could cause serious
loss of life and property.

Branam indicates that it was the

purpose of § 63-30-3, para. 2, to protect such emergency flood
control activities.
In contrast, the construction of long-term flood control
systems when no emergency is threatening cannot be an exercise of
police power.

ff

[I]n the absence of any compelling emergency or

the pressure of public necessity, the courts will be slow to
invoke the doctrine of police power . . . where damage to private
parties

can be

averted

by proper

precautions in the first place."

construction

and proper

Ward v. Concrete Products Co.

v. L.A. County Flood Control District 149 Cal. App.2d 840, 309
P.2d 546 (1957).

See also Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123

P.2d 505, 516 (1942); Jordan v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 15 Utah
449, 49 P. 746 (1897); Short v. Pierce County, 78 P.2d 610 (Wash.
1938).

The difference between the two is like the difference
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between fighting a fire versus building a fire station.

The

former is an exercise of police power, while the latter is not.
Thus, insofar as § 63-30-3 gives absolute immunity to nonemergency flood control construction, the classification does not
in fact reasonably

and substantially

objective, but is overinclusive.
immunity

further the statutory

It goes beyond

granting

for a police-power, essential governmental

function

(emergency flood control), and unnecessarily grants immunity for
a non-police power, non-governmental
flood

control

construction).

function

This

(non-emergency

additional

immunity

unnecessarily burdens plaintiff's constitutional rights to a
remedy under article I, § 11.
The City argues that the objective of the statute is to
protect monies in the state disaster relief fund and municipal
treasuries so that flood control measures can be carried out.
(Respondent's brief at 17.)

The protection of the treasury,

however, is not an end in itself; the treasury should only be
protected to the extent that "essential functions of government
will not be imperiled."

See Condemarin v. University Hospital,

775 P.2d 348, 372 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J. separate concurring
opinion).
then

If protecting the treasury were the ultimate goal,

the Governmental

Immunity

Act would

liability for non-governmental functions.

not have waived

Thus, even under the

City's own analysis, granting immunity for non-emergency flood
control construction does not further the statutory objective.
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(c)

The Degree to Which the Statute Unreasonably Burdens

Constitutional

Rights,

Finally,

the

determination

of

reasonableness must take into account the degree to which
constitutional

rights are diminished.

An absolute-immunity

interpretation of § 63-30-3, para. 2, gives cities a license to
needlessly

damage persons' property

in the name of

"flood

control," even though with proper planning and precaution such
damage could be prevented.

Arguable, a city could call any

ditch, canal, or water course improvement a "flood control"
measure, and thereby escape liability where otherwise it would be
liable.

Allowing

cities to do so would

"mercilessly

and

senselessly" bar victims of municipal negligence from recovering
for injuries sustained at the hands of entities designed to serve
them.

See Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230,

1237 (Utah 1980).

Such a result completely ignores the objective

of the Governmental
liability

Immunity Act to extend government tort

in cases where

only

non-essential

governmental

functions are involved.
In conclusion, an absolute-immunity interpretation of § 6330-3 goes far beyond what is required to ensure that government
can respond

to flood emergencies.

Such an

interpretation

violates article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution by treating
similarly situated persons differently.
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Point II: Article I, § 22 Is a Constitutional Waiver of Immunity
That Extends to Non-Intentional Damages
A.

Article I, § 22 Is a Constitutional Waiver of Immunity

In its appellant's brief, Farmers argued that this Court
should overrule Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P. 2d at 105
(Utah 1960) and its progeny.

The City does not dispute any of

the arguments made by Farmers for overruling Fairclough, nor does
the City make any substantive arguments for retaining the rule in
Fairclough.

The

only

argument made by the

City

to

avoid

overruling Fairclough is a purely technical one, namely, that the
legislature obviated the need to overrule Fairclough by passing §
63-30-10.5, which waives sovereign immunity

for takings or

damagings without just compensation.
It is difficult to see how the passage of § 63-30-10.5
obviates the need to overrule Fairclough.

Regardless of any

statutory waiver of immunity for inverse condemnation suits,
Farmers has a constitutional right under article I, § 22 to bring
suit.

Since that right exists independent of the statute,

Fairclough must be overruled.
Furthermore,

the waiver made by

§ 63-30-10.5

is not

sufficiently broad to substitute for the constitutional right
under article I, § 22.

By its express terms, § 63-30-10.5 limits

compensation to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78, which
governs eminent domain proceedings.

The standards set forth in

that chapter are only designed to allow compensation for damages
that can be anticipated

before construction

begins.

Such

standards are clearly insufficient to cover inverse condemnation
19

suits, which typically seek compensation for damages that could
not be anticipated before construction,
B.

Article I, § 22 Extends to Non-Intentional Damages

The City next argues that article I, § 22 does not extend to
non-intentional damages.

In so arguing, however, the City does

not address any of Farmers' arguments in support of a rule
allowing compensation for non-intentional damages.

Rather, the

City relies solely on Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah
1921), to support its position.
Lund should be either distinguished or overruled.
reasons

for

distinguishing

Lund

are

stated

appellant's brief and need not be repeated here.
overruling Lund are worthy of some elaboration.

in

The

Farmer's

The reasons for
A rule requiring

intent unreasonably restricts the scope of article I, § 22 to
only a small percentage of the cases that article I, § 22 was
intended

to cover,

"for prior to the construction

of the

improvement which causes the injury it may not be apparent that
damage will result."
(1942).

Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505

Moreover, the rule applied by Lund is unsupported by the

reasoning of Lund itself and by the better-reasoned modern cases.
The only context in which Lund makes sense would be in an eminent
domain proceeding, held before construction begins, in which a
determination will be made of the necessary damages for which
advance compensation should be given.
The City argues that the Lund rule is consistent with the
language of article I, § 22, which states that that property must
20

be damaged "for" public use.

The City asserts that the public

must benefit from the damage caused if it is to be "for" public
use; otherwise, the damage is merely "by" public use, and thus
outside the scope of article I, § 22.
The City's construction of the "damaged for public use"
clause is nonsensical.

Obviously, where damage results from the

construction of a public improvement, the benefit to the public
can only be the improvement, not the damage.

The only reasonable

interpretation of "damaged for public use," in the context of
public

improvements, is that the damage was caused by the

construction of the improvement.

Thus, this Court has stated,

"Consequential damages to property which are caused by making
public improvements are recoverable under

[article I, §22]."

Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) (emphasis
added.)

Accord Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 2, § 6.22 at 6-

159, and Vol. 2A, § 6.30 (3rd. ed 1985 & 1987).
The late Justice Traynor explained this rule as follows:
The destruction or damaging of property is
sufficiently connected with "public use," as
required by the [California] Constitution, if
the injury is a result of dangers inherent in
the construction of the public improvement as
distinguished from dangers arising from the
negligent operation of the improvement. The
construction of the public improvement is a
deliberate action of the state or its agency
in furtherance of public purposes.
... The
decisive consideration is the effect of the
public improvement on the property and
whether the owner of the damaged property if
uncompensated would contribute more than his
proper share to the public undertaking. It
is irrelevant whether or not the injury to
the p r o p e r t y is a c c o m p a n i e d
by a
corresponding benefit to the public purpose
21

to which the improvement is dedicated, since
the measure of liability is not the benefit
derived from the property, but the loss to
the owner.
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 25 Cal. 2d
384,

153 P.2d

950, 955-56

(1944) (Traynor, J.,

concurring)

(emphasis added).
The City also argues that the Lund rule is consistent with
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-10.5, which limits compensation for damages
to the standards for eminent domain proceedings.

See § 78-34-

10(3) (damages that "will" be caused by construction).
argument merely highlights

This

the fact that § 63-30-10.5, as

presently enacted, is not sufficiently broad to cover inverse
condemnation cases, since § 63-30-10.5 is restricted to eminent
domain standards.
In summary,
overruled.

the Lund rule should be distinguished

or

The "damaged for public use" language of article I, §

22 in no way supports a retention of the Lund rule.
Point III:

Taking May Occur When a Physical Invasion Results
in Loss of Use

The City argues that there was no "taking" in this case
because economic impact alone cannot rise to the level of taking.
It asserts that Farmers has merely asserted a "negative economic
impact on plaintiff's investment in the mall property."

In so

doing, the City mischaracterizes the "essentially ad hoc" factual
inquiry essential to a determination of a taking.

See Penn

Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
22

In Penn Central, the Supreme Court lamented the lack of
clear guidelines to determine a "taking."
analysis

of

takings

cases,

After a protracted

it asserted

that two primary

considerations should be applied before dismissing a "taking"
claim: (1) the character of the state action; and (2) the nature
and extent of the interference.

The economic impact of the

"taking" is a relevant consideration, and may be dispositive
where

state

action

interferes

with

interests

that

are

sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the
claimant.

Penn Central at 125.

The Court further determined

that where the present use of the land was affected, a "taking"
occurs.

Id. at 128.

The Court concluded that no taking had

occurred because the present use of the building had not been
impaired and Penn Central could still realize a reasonable return
on its investment.
In this case the damage caused by the City rendered portions
of the Mall uninhabitable, and thus destroyed the mall's present
use and any reasonable expectation of a return on Farmers1
investment.

Farmers cannot use the mall without first repairing

the damage.

Thus, the City deprived Farmers of both the present

use of the full mall and any reasonable expectation of investment
return.
This "economic impact" springs directly from the City's
actual, physical damage to the mall.
taking

results

standing alone.

from

This is not a case where a

the mere diminution

See Penn Central at 131.
23

in property

value

Rather, Farmers has

been denied the present use of the property and any resulting
economic benefit because of the City's action.

Farmers should be

compensated for its loss.
Point IV: The Easement Granted by Farmers Created a Contract
Between Farmers and Bountiful City, and thus the City
Is Estopped from Asserting Sovereign Immunity
The City next argues that the trial court correctly ruled
there was no implied contract between the City and Farmers
because an easement is a mere grant that creates no duties from
the grantee to the grantor.

Furthermore, the City argues, it did

not even sign the instrument granting the easement.
Although

an easement

takes

the

form

of

a grant, it

nonetheless creates obligations between the grantor and the
grantee just as comprehensive as those between a covenantor and a
covenantee.

Hottell v. Farmers1 Protective Assoc, 53 P. 327,

329 (Colo. 1898).

Included in these obligations is the duty of

the grantee to "exercise his rights so as not unreasonably to
interfere with the [grantor's rights]."

Big Cottonwood Tanner

Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946).
By virtue of such covenants, the parties to the easement
enter into an implied contract.

The term "covenant" means to

enter into an agreement or "bind oneself to a contract."
v. Hardie, 177 Kan. 353, 279 P.2d 276 (1955).

Beall

The grantee's

signature is not required to create such a contract, so long as
the grantee accepts the delivered conveyance.
Realty Insurance Co., 80 P.2d 471, 477 (Utah 1948).
the City

accepted

delivery

of the instrument
24

Bracklein v.
In this case
granting

the

easement, and by so doing manifested its assent to the contract
implied in such a grant.
The City could not have built the culvert in this case
without either getting Farmersf consent "or instituting an eminent
domain proceeding.

In giving its consent, Farmers relied on the

implied covenant that the City's use of the easement would be
reasonable, including giving reasonable lateral support.

Farmers

would never have given its consent had it known that the City
would damage Farmers' mall.
CONCLUSION
It would be indeed ironic if, in its efforts to guard
against

future

flooding, a city could carelessly harm with

impunity the very persons it is supposed to protect.

This Court

should refuse to allow such an injustice by granting Farmers the
relief it requests.
DATED this 31st day of October, 1989.

James L. Chiristensen
Paul D. Newton
Mark J. Morrise
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING
The undersigned, attorney for plaintiff and appellant
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co., hereby certifies that on
the 31st day of October, 1989, he caused the foregoing
"Appellant's Reply Brief" to be served on all parties to this
appeal, by mailing copies thereof by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, on the following:
Attorneys for Bountiful City
Allan L. Larson
Stanley J. Preston
Robert C. Keller
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dated:

\\o^ls ,v<

C c t 3f K¥<jf

James L. C h r i s t e n s e n
Paul D. Newton
Mark J . M o r r i s e
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